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Abstract
Modal logics of strategic ability form one of the fields where logic and
game theory can successfully meet. However, defining a good semantics
of abilities under imperfect information proved to be a difficult task. In
our previous work, we have proposed a logic which – we believe – cap-
tures such abilities in an elegant and general way. However, the seman-
tics of the logic is fairly non-standard, as it defines the truth of formulae
for sets of states (rather than single states). In this paper, we present a
standard, state-based semantics for a relevant subset of the logic. We also
discuss explicit operators for complement, union, intersection, and tran-
sitive closure of epistemic relations. The resulting language is studied on
a variant of the coordinated attack problem.
1 Introduction
Modal logics of strategic ability [1, 2, 19, 20] form one of the fields where
logic and game theory can successfully meet. The logics have clear possi-
ble worlds semantics, are axiomatizable, and have some interesting compu-
tational properties. Moreover, they are underpinned by a clear and intu-
itively appealing conceptual machinery for modeling and reasoning about
systems that involvemultiple autonomous agents. Alternating-time Tempo-
ral Logic(ATL) [1, 2], is probably the most important logic of strategic ability
that has emerged in recent years. However, ATL considers only agents that
possess perfect information about the current state of the world, and such
agents seldom exist in reality. A combination of ATL and epistemic logic,
called Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL), was introduced to en-
able reasoning about agents acting under imperfect information [26]. Still,
it has been pointed out in several places [11, 14, 15, 8] that the meaning of
ATEL formulae can be counterintuitive. Most importantly, an agent’s ability
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to achieve property ϕ should imply that the agent has enough control and
knowledge to identify and execute a strategy that enforces ϕ.
In [13], we have proposed Constructive Strategic Logic (CSL) which – we
believe – allows to capture knowledge and abilities of agents with imperfect
information in an elegant and general way. However, the semantics of CSL is
fairly non-standard. In this paper, we present a standard, state-based seman-
tics for CSLnf , a subset of CSL formulae in constructive normal formwhich is no
less expressive than the full CSL. Although the more rigid structure prevents
e.g. some typical axioms from being formulae of CSLnf , they can be rewritten
to equivalent CSLnf counterparts.
Having defined the new semantics, we observe that a sequence of epis-
temic operators denotes a relation which is the sequential composition of
the corresponding epistemic relations. We suggest that other ways of com-
bining individual views of agents in a group are also meaningful. To this
end, we introduce explicit operators that yield complement, union, and in-
tersection of relations (analogous to role constructors used in description log-
ics [3]). Moreover, we propose to use the transitive closure operator of dy-
namic logic [21, 9, 24]. We show that the typical collective knowledge oper-
ators can be naturally defined by these constructors from individual knowl-
edge – but there are more possible combinations that can be used. We study
the resulting language on a variant of the coordinated attack problem. Fi-
nally, we point out that the extension does not increase themodel checking
complexity.
2 What Agents CanAchieve
2.1 ATL: Ability in Perfect InformationGames
ATL [1, 2] can be understood as a generalization of the branching time tem-
poral logic CTL [4, 5], in which path quantifiers are replaced with so called
cooperation modalities. The formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, where A is a coalition of agents,
expresses that A have a collective strategy to enforce ϕ. ATL formulae in-
clude temporal operators: “ h” (“in the next state”), 2 (“always from now
on”) and U (“until”). Operator 3 (“now or sometime in the future”) can
be defined as 3ϕ ≡ >U ϕ. Similarly to CTL, every occurrence of a tempo-
ral operator is immediately preceded by exactly one cooperation modality.1
The broader language of ATL∗, in which no such restriction is imposed, is not
discussed in this paper.
LetA be a set of agents. Formally, the recursive definition of ATL formulae
is:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ | 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ
1 The logic to which such a syntactic restriction applies is sometimes called “vanilla” ATL
(resp. “vanilla” CTL etc.).
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Example ATL properties are: 〈〈jamesbond〉〉3win (James Bond has an infalli-
ble plan to eventually win), and 〈〈jamesbond, bondsgirl〉〉 funU shot− at (Bond
and his current girlfriend have a collective way of having fun until someone
shoots at them).
A number of semantics have been defined for ATL, most of them equiva-
lent [6, 7]. In this paper, we use a variant of concurrent game structures asmod-
els. A concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple M = 〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉
which includes anonemptyfinite set of all agentsAgt = {1, . . . , k}, a nonempty
set of states St, a set of atomic propositions Π, a valuation of propositions
pi : Π → 2St, and a set of (atomic) actions Act. Function d : Agt × St →
(2Act \ ∅) defines nonempty sets of actions available to agents at each state,
and o is a (deterministic) transition function that assigns the outcome state
q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to state q and a tuple of actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉, αi ∈ d(i, q),
that can be executed by Agt in q. A (memoryless) strategy sa of agent a is a
conditional plan that specifies what a is going to do for every possible situa-
tion: sa : St→ Act such that sa(q) ∈ d(a, q). A collective strategy SA for a group
of agentsA is a tuple of strategies, one per agent fromA.
A path Λ in modelM is an infinite sequence of states that can be effected
by subsequent transitions, and refers to a possible course of action (or a pos-
sible computation) that may occur in the system; by Λ[i], we denote the ith
position on path Λ. Function out(q, SA) returns the set of all paths that may
result from agentsA executing strategy SA from state q onward:
out(q, SA) = {λ = q0q1q2 · · · | q0 = q and for every i = 1, 2, . . . there exists
a tuple of agents’ decisions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 such that αa = SA(a)(qi−1) for
each a ∈ A, and αa ∈ d(a, qi−1) for each a /∈ A, and o(qi−1, α1, . . . , αk) =
qi}.
The semantics of ATL formulae can be given via the following clauses:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q) (for p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q 6|= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ iff there is a collective strategy SA such that, for every
Λ ∈ out(q, SA), we haveM,Λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(q, SA), we
haveM,Λ[i] for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there existsSA such that for everyΛ ∈ out(q, SA) there
is an i ≥ 0, for whichM,Λ[i] |= ψ, andM,Λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
2.2 ATLwith Epistemic Logic
Real-life agents seldompossess complete information about the current state
of the world. On the other hand, imperfect information and knowledge are
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handled in epistemic logic in a natural way. A combination of ATL and epis-
temic logic, called Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) was intro-
duced to enable reasoning about agents acting under imperfect information.
ATEL [26] enriches the picture with an epistemic component, adding to
ATL operators for representing agents’ knowledge:Kaϕ reads as “agent a knows
that ϕ”. Additional operatorsEAϕ,CAϕ, andDAϕ, whereA is a set of agents,
refer to mutual knowledge (“everybody knows”), common knowledge, and dis-
tributed knowledge among the agents from A. Models for ATEL extend con-
current game structures with epistemic accessibility relations ∼1, . . . ,∼k⊆
Q×Q (one per agent) for modeling agents’ uncertainty.2 We call suchmod-
els concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGS).3 Agent a’s epistemic relation
is meant to encode a’s inability to distinguish between the (global) system
states: q ∼a q′ means that, while the system is in state q, agent a cannot de-
termine whether it is in q or q′. Then, the semantics ofKa is defined as:
M, q |= Kaϕ iffM, q′ |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
Relations ∼EA, ∼CA and ∼DA , used to model group epistemics, are derived
from the individual relations of agents fromA. First,∼EA is the union of rela-
tions ∼a, a ∈ A. Next, ∼CA is defined as the transitive closure of ∼EA. Finally,
∼DA is the intersection of all the∼a, a ∈ A. The semantics of group knowledge
can be defined as below (forK = C,E,D):
M, q |= KAϕ iffM, q′ |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼KA q′.
Note that Ka ≡ C{a} ≡ E{a} ≡ D{a}, so individual knowledge operators Ka
are in fact redundant.
It has been pointed out in several places that such a straightforward com-
bination of ATL and epistemic logic can be counterintuitive [11, 14, 15], as
the following example shows.
Example 1 There is a broken lightbulb and a switch in the room. Agent i has two
available actions: turn the switch or replace the bulb. Before replacing it, he needs
to make sure that the electricity is off, otherwise he can get a shock. However, he
does not know in which position the switch is “on”, and in which it is “off”.
Intuitively, there is no strategy that guarantees that the agent replaces the bulb
safely. However, the ATL formula 〈〈i〉〉safeU (safe∧ bulbOK) holds for both possible
states of the switch. Suppose first that the switch is off: then, the strategy “replace
the bulb” clearly achieves the goal. Likewise, there is a successful strategy for the
switch being on, namely “turn the switch off and then replace the bulb”. Even the
ATEL formulaKi〈〈i〉〉safeU (safe∧bulbOK) holds, because i has a strategy to enforce
safeU (safe∧bulbOK) for each state that he considers possible (switch on/switch off)
– and the semantics of ATEL does not require these two strategies to be identical.
2 The relations are assumed to be equivalences.
3 Additionally, we will assume that CEGS are uniform, i.e., agents have the same choices in
indistinguishable states (q ∼a q′ implies da(q) = da(q′)).
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Most importantly, onewould expect that an agent’s ability to achieve prop-
erty ϕ should imply that the agent has enough control and knowledge to
identify and execute a strategy that enforces ϕ (cf. also [23]). The problem
is closely related to the distinction between knowledge de re and knowledge
de dicto [22, 17, 18, 28]. One can naturally distinguish at least four different
levels of strategic ability (cf. [14]):
1. Agent a has a strategy “de re” to enforce ϕ, i.e., he has an executable
winning strategy and knows the strategy (he “knows how to play”);
2. Agent a has a strategy “de dicto” to enforce ϕ (i.e., he knows only that
some executable winning strategy is available);
3. Agent a has an executable strategy to enforce ϕ (but not necessarily
even knows about it);
4. Agent amay happen to behave in such a way that ϕ is enforced. How-
ever, the behavior canhaveno executable specification (i.e., theremight
be no uniform strategy that describes it).
Unfortunately, ATEL enables to express only ability of type (4). A number
of logics were proposed to capture abilities on various levels [11, 14, 23, 15,
27, 10], yet none of them seemed the ultimate definitive solution.
2.3 Constructive Strategic Logic
In [13], we have proposed Constructive Strategic Logic (CSL) which, as we be-
lieve, allows to address the interplay between knowledge and abilities under
imperfect information in a way that is both elegant and general. By “gen-
eral”, we mean that it allows to characterize as many meaningful levels of
strategic ability as possible (and at least as many as ATOL [14]). In particu-
lar, it should enable the distinction between various readings of knowing a
strategy “de re” and “de dicto” for individual as well as collective players. By
“elegant”, we mean that it allows us to express various levels of ability by
composition of epistemic operators with strategic operators, instead of assign-
ing a specializedmodality to every conceivable combination.
To achieve this, we built our proposal around new epistemic operators for
what we call “practical” or “constructive” knowledge. The idea was inspired
by the tradition of constructivism which argues that one must find (or “con-
struct”) a mathematical object to prove that it exists [25]. Agents A construc-
tively know that 〈〈B〉〉ϕ if they can present a strategy for B that guarantees
achieving ϕ. In our semantics formulae are interpreted over sets of states
rather than single states. This reflects the intuition that the “constructive”
ability to enforce ϕ means that the agents in question have a single strat-
egy that brings about ϕ from all subjectively possible initial situations. We
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write M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ to express the fact that A must have a strategy which
is successful from all states in set Q. The constructive knowledge operators
Ka,EA,CA,DA yield sets of states for which a single evidence (i.e., a success-
ful strategy) should be presented.
The language of Constructive Strategic Logic can be defined as below:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ | 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ | CAϕ | EAϕ | DAϕ.
Models are concurrent epistemic game structures again, and we restrict
strategies to so called uniform ones. Strategy sa is uniform iff q ∼a q′ im-
plies sa(q) = sa(q′); a collective strategy is uniform iff it consists of only
uniform individual strategies. The notion of a formula ϕ being satisfied by
a (non-empty) set of states Q in a model M , written M,Q |= ϕ, can be de-
fined as follows. Let img(q,R) be the image of state q with respect to bi-
nary relation R, i.e., the set of all states q′ such that qRq′. Moreover, we
use out(Q,SA) as a shorthand for
⋃
q∈Q out(q, SA), and img(Q,R) as a short-
hand for
⋃
q∈Q img(q,R). The new semantics is given through the following
clauses.
M,Q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q) for every q ∈ Q;
M,Q |= ¬ϕ iffM,Q 6|= ϕ;
M,Q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM,Q |= ϕ andM,Q |= ψ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ iff there exists memoryless uniform SA such that, for
every Λ ∈ out(Q,SA), we have thatM, {Λ[1]} |= ϕ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(Q,SA) and
i ≥ 0, we haveM, {Λ[i]} |= ϕ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(Q,SA),
there is an i ≥ 0 for whichM, {Λ[i]} |= ψ andM, {Λ[j]} |= ϕ for every
0 ≤ j < i.
M,Q |= KˆAϕ iffM, img(Q,∼KA) |= ϕ (where Kˆ = C,E,D and K = C,E,D,
respectively).
We alsowriteM, q |= ϕ as a shorthand forM, {q} |= ϕ. Additionally, we de-
fine: 3ϕ ≡ >U ϕ, Kaϕ ≡ C{a}ϕ, and we use the usual definitions of Boolean
connectives ∨,→,↔. Standard knowledge can be defined as special case of
constructive knowledge: KAϕ ≡ KˆANow(ϕ) where Now(ϕ) ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉ϕU ϕ ex-
presses that ϕ holds at the current state of the system (or, more, precisely, in
every possible current state fromQ). Finally,Kaϕ ≡ C{a}ϕ.
The followingproposition shows that CSL ismore expressive than themost
important previous proposals: F-ATEL [15], ATLir [23] and ATOL [14].
Proposition 1 ([13]) There is a succinct translation from ATLir, ATOL and F-
ATEL to CSL that preserves satisfaction and validity of formulae. Moreover, CSL is
strictly more expressive than ATLir, ATOL and F-ATEL.
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The main advantage of CSL is that it allows the expression of the fact that
an agent or coalition knows how to achieve its goal, as distinct from know-
ing that the goal can be somehow achieved. The former is captured by the
formula saying that there is a strategy which is successful in all states the
agent/coalition considers possible, while the latter is captured by the for-
mula which states that in all possible states there is a successful strategy.
Proposition 2 ([13]) CSL allows to capture abilities of types (1)-(3). More pre-
cisely:
• M, q |= Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ iff agent a has a strategy “de re” to enforce ϕ from q;
• M, q |= Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ iff a has a strategy “de dicto” to enforce ϕ from q;
• M, q |= 〈〈a〉〉ϕ iff a has a strategy to enforce ϕ from q.
Capturing different ability levels of coalitions is analogous, with various “epistemic
modes” of collective recognizing the right strategy.
Thus, CSL provides a natural way of distinguishing between knowing how
to play (ability “de re”) and weaker forms of strategic abilities. Nota also that
constructive knowledge operators capture thenotion of ability “de re”, while
standard epistemic operators refer to having a strategy “de dicto”.
Consider again the system fromExample 1. Wehave thatKi〈〈i〉〉safeU (safe∧
bulbOK), but ¬Ki〈〈i〉〉safeU (safe ∧ bulbOK) – the latter because no single strat-
egy is successful in both states (electricity on/off) the agent considers possi-
ble. Thus, CSL allows to express that the agent knows that there is a way of
replacing the bulb, but he does not effectively knowhow to do it. Some subtler
strategic properties can be studied on the variant of the Coordinated Attack
problem, presented in the next section.
3 Example: Onion SoupRobbery
A virtual safe contains the recipe for the best onion soup in the world. The
safe can only be opened by a k-digit binary code, where each digit ci is sent
from a prescribed location i (1 ≤ i ≤ k). To open the safe and download
the recipe it is enough that at least n ≤ k correct digits are sent at the same
moment. However, if awrong value is sent from one of the locations, or if an
insufficient number (i.e., between 1 and n−1) of digits is submitted, then the
safe locks up and activates an alarm.
k agents are connected at the right locations; each of them can send 0,
send 1, or do nothing (nop). Moreover, individual agents have only partial
information about the code. To make the example more concrete, we as-
sume that agent i (connected to location i) knows the values of ci−1 XOR ci
and ci XOR ci+1 (we take c0 = ck+1 = 0). This implies that only agents 1 and k
know the values of “their” digits. Still, every agent knowswhether his neigh-
bors’ digits are the same as his.
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Definition 1 (Attacknk )
• Agt = {1, . . . , k};
• St = Q ∪ S, where states in Q = {q = 〈c1, . . . , ck〉 | q ∈ {0, 1}k} identify
possible codes for the (closed) safe, and states inS = {open, alarm} represent
the situations when the safe has been opened, or when the alarm has been
activated;
• Π = {open}; pi(open) = {open}; Act = {0, 1, nop};
• d(i, q) = {0, 1, nop} for q ∈ Q, and d(i, s) = {nop} for s ∈ S;
• For all x ∈ St: o(x, nop, . . . , nop) = x. For q ∈ Q, and at least one αi 6= nop:
o(q, α1, . . . , αk) = open if αj = cj for at least n agents j and αi /∈ {ci, nop}
for no i; else, o(q, α1, . . . , αk) = alarm.
• q ∼i q′ iff q[i − 1]XOR q[i] = q′[i − 1]XOR q′[i] and q[i]XOR q[i + 1] =
q′[i]XOR q′[i+ 1].
ForAttacknk , k ≥ 3, the following CSL properties hold in every state q ∈ Q:
• 〈〈Agt〉〉3open∧¬EAgt〈〈Agt〉〉3open: there is an executable strategy for the
agents, which guarantees a win, but not all of them can identify it (in
fact, none of them can in this case);
• DAgt〈〈Agt〉〉3open: if the agents share information they can recognize
who should send what;
• D{1,...,n−1}〈〈Agt〉〉3open: it is enough that the first n − 1 agents devise
the strategy. Note that the same holds for the last n− 1 agents, i.e., the
subteam {k − n+ 2, . . . , k};
• Still,¬D{1,...,n−1}〈〈1, . . . , n− 1〉〉3open: all agents are necessary to execute
the strategy.
We observe that constructive knowledge operators allow to approximate
the amount of communication that is needed to establish a winning strat-
egy in scenarios where explicit modeling of communication is impossible or
too expensive. For instance, formulaDAgt〈〈Agt〉〉3open says that if the agents
in Agt share their information they will be able to determine a strategy that
opens the safe. Of course, the model does not include a possibility of such
“sharing”, at least not explicitly. That is, there is no transition that leads to a
state in which the epistemic relations of agents have been combined via in-
tersection. Still,DAϕ indicates that there is epistemic potential for agents inA
to realize/inferϕ; whatmight bemissing ismeans of exploiting the potential
(e.g., communication). In the same way, DA〈〈A〉〉 hϕ says that the epistemic
potential for A to determine the right strategy for hϕ is there, too. So, it
might be profitable to design efficient communicationmechanisms tomake
themost of it.
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4 Normal FormCSL
In this section, we first recall (and slightly refine) the concept of constructive
normal form (CSNF) introduced in [13]. Then, we define formally the syn-
tax and semantics of “normal form CSL”. The semantics is state-based in the
sense that a single state appears on the left hand side of the satisfaction rela-
tion |=.
4.1 Constructive Normal Form
Definition 2 A CSL formula is in constructive normal form (CSNF) if every
subformula starting with a KˆA operator is of the form KˆA1 . . . KˆAnψ where ψ starts
with a cooperation modality.
The following proposition is a straightforward corollary of [13, Theorem
60].
Proposition 3 Every CSL formula is strongly equivalent to a formula in con-
structive normal form. That is, for every formula ϕ of CSL, there is a normal form
formula ϕ′ such thatM,Q |= ϕ iffM,Q |= ϕ′. The transformation to normal form
can be done in linear time and yields a formula which can be only linearly longer
than ϕ.
We use CSLnf to denote the sublanguage of CSL consisting only of formulae
in CSNF. It turns out that the importance of the normal form goes beyond
technicalities. In Section 4.3, we show that formulae of CSLnf can be given
standard state-based semantics, similar to those of ATL and CTL.
4.2 Rephrasing the Syntax
We recall from Section 4.1 that, by using only formulae in constructive nor-
mal form, we do not lose any expressivity. However, CSLnf imposes some con-
straints on the usage of constructive knowledge operators, so that not every
property can be written verbatim in CSLnf– although for every property, an
equivalent CSLnf formula can be found (cf. Example 2 below).
Before defining the new semantics, we rephrase the definition of CSLnf to a
more convenient form:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ε〈〈A〉〉 hϕ | ε〈〈A〉〉2ϕ | ε〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ,
where p ∈ Π is an atomic proposition, A ⊆ Agt a group of agents, and ε =
Kˆ1A1 . . . KˆnAn stands for a (possibly empty) sequence of constructive knowl-
edge operators Kˆ = C,E,D, indexedby (possibly different) coalitions of agents.
Additional operators are defined as in Section 2.3.
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Example 2 Consider the CSL formula CA(safe → 〈〈A〉〉2safe). Clearly, it is not
a formula of CSLnf . Still, it has an equivalent normal form formula¬CANow(safe)∨
CA〈〈A〉〉2safe (that is, these two formulae have the same truth value for everymodel
and set of states in the model).
Note also that all the formulaementioned in Section 3 belong to “normal
form CSL”. In fact, for most properties that can be written in CSL, they are
most naturally expressed in their strategic normal form.
4.3 Semantics
In Definition 5, we present the semantic clauses for CSLnf . The first three
clauses are completely standard for modal logic. The other three clauses
define the semantics of cooperation modalities coupled with constructive
knowledge operators (in prettymuch the sameway as temporal operators are
coupled with path quantifiers in CTL). A sequence of operators Kˆ = C,E,D
yields a composition of the corresponding epistemic relations, which is used
to determine the set of states that seem subjectively possible in state q. First,
we define the correspondence formally, and then we present the clauses.
Definition 3 LetR1,R2 ⊆ St × St be binary relations on states. The compo-
sition ofR1 andR2 is defined as
R1 ◦ R2 = {〈q, q′′〉 | there is q′ such that qR1q′ and q′R1q′′}.
As the composition is additive, its definition naturally extends to an arbitrary
number of relations (R1 ◦ · · · ◦ Rn). We assume that a composition of an empty
sequence of relations is just the identity relation.
Definition 4 Let ε = Kˆ1A1 . . . KˆnAn be a sequence of constructive knowledge oper-
ators. The relation corresponding to ε is defined as rel(ε) =∼K1A1 ◦ · · · ◦ ∼K
n
An
.
In accordancewith definition 3, we define the relation corresponding to the empty
string as the identity relation on states: rel(∅) = idSt.
Definition 5 The semantics of CSLnf is defined through the clauses below.
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q) (for p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q 6|= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ;
M, q |= ε〈〈A〉〉 hϕ iff there is a memoryless uniform strategy SA such that, for
every Λ ∈ out(img(q, rel(ε)), SA), we haveM,Λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= ε〈〈A〉〉2ϕ iff there is SA such that, for everyΛ ∈ out(img(q, rel(ε)), SA),
we haveM,Λ[i] for every i ≥ 0;
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M, q |= ε〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there isSA such that for everyΛ ∈ out(img(q, rel(ε)), SA)
there is an i ≥ 0, for whichM,Λ[i] |= ψ, andM,Λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
The above semantics is equivalent to the semantics of CSL presented in
Section 2.3.
Proposition 4 Let ϕ be a formula of CSLnf . Then,M, q |=
CSLnf
ϕ iffM, q |=
CSL
ϕ.
Proof. (Induction on the structure of ϕ)
• Case ϕ ≡ p:M, q |=
CSLnf
p iff p ∈ pi(q) iffM, q |=
CSL
p.
• Caseϕ ≡ ¬ψ:M, q |=
CSLnf
¬ψ iffM, q 6|=
CSLnf
ψ iff (by induction)M, q 6|=
CSL
ψ
iffM, q |=
CSL
¬ψ.
• Cases ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2,KAϕ: analogous.
• Case ϕ ≡ Kˆ1A1 . . . KˆnAn〈〈A〉〉 hψ:
M, q |=
CSLnf
Kˆ1A1 . . . KˆnAn〈〈A〉〉 hψ iff there is SA such that for every Λ ∈
out(img(q,∼K1A1 ◦ · · · ◦ ∼K
n
An
), SA) we have M,Λ[1] |=
CSLnf
ψ iff (by induc-
tion) there is SA such that for everyΛ ∈ out(img(q,∼K1A1 ◦ · · · ◦ ∼K
n
An
), SA)
wehaveM,Λ[1] |=
CSL
ψ iff (by the semantics of CSL)M, img(q,∼K1A1 ◦ · · · ◦ ∼K
n
An
) |=
CSL
〈〈A〉〉 hψ iffM, q |=
CSL
Kˆ1A1 . . . KˆnAn〈〈A〉〉 hψ.
• Cases ϕ ≡ Kˆ1A1 . . . KˆnAn〈〈A〉〉2ψ, Kˆ1A1 . . . KˆnAn〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2: analogous.

5 Flexible Aggregation of Uncertainty Sets
Constructive knowledge operators are used in CSL (and CSLnf) to “aggregate”
a set of states for which the coalition should find a successful strategy. In the
relational view of the previous section, such an operator corresponds to a re-
lation on states, and the set is taken as the image of the current state with
respect to the relation. An operator can appear alone or in a sequence; in the
latter case, the corresponding relation is the composition of particular rela-
tions. The only way to combine individual epistemic relations in a different
way (i.e., not through relational composition) is to employ the predefined
operators of collective knowledge CA,EA,DA.
In this section, we propose to use more basic operators for combining in-
dividual views of agents. Besides composition, explicit operators that yield
union, intersection, complement and transitive closure are added. We show
that the resulting language of epistemic expressions allows to express strictly
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more epistemic properties than before. Moreover, the properties can be ex-
pressed by combining only individual knowledge operators.
The idea is very similar to relational operations on programs (or actions)
that can be found in dynamic logic [21, 9] (cf. also Segerberg’s work on logic
of iteration [24]). There, the nondeterministic choice operator (∪) is inter-
preted as the union of underlying relations, and iteration (∗) facilitates the
reflexive and transitive closure.4 Analogous operators (for complement, union,
and intersection of relations) are used as role constructors in description log-
ics [3].
5.1 Epistemic Expressions and Their Interpretation
So far, the only epistemic expressions that we used were sequences of knowl-
edge operators (individual and/or collective). Now we allow the expressions
to have more sophisticated structure. It turns out that, with the enhanced
epistemic expressions, we do not need collective knowledge operators any
more.
Formally, the language of CSLnf is now redefined as follows. The produc-
tion rule for formulae ϕ is the same as before; the only thing that changes is
the set of epistemic expressions ε. Moreover, we only need to define an inter-
pretation of the new knowledge terms in order to extend the semantics. The
semantic clauses for formulae ϕ stay the same as in section 4.3.
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ε〈〈A〉〉 hϕ | ε〈〈A〉〉2ϕ | ε〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ,
ε ::= ∅ | Ka | ε | ε u ε | εε | ε∗.
Additionally, we define ε1unionsq ε2 = ε1 u ε2. The relation rel behind epistemic
expressions is now extended as follows:
• rel(∅) = idSt,
• rel(Ka) =∼a,
• rel(ε) = rel(ε),
• rel(ε1 u ε2) = rel(ε1) ∩ rel(ε2),
• rel(ε1ε2) = rel(ε1) ◦ rel(ε2),
• rel(ε∗) is the reflexive and transitive closure of rel(ε).
It is easy to see that rel(ε1 unionsq ε2) = rel(ε1) ∪ rel(ε2). Note that ε1 u ε2 refers
to the knowledge obtained by joining knowledge behind ε1 and ε2. Thus, on
the semantic side, it is modeled by reducing the uncertainty (or ignorance)
represented by rel(ε1), rel(ε2) to their intersection. Analogously, ε1unionsqε2 refers
4 There is also the sequential composition of programs ; that corresponds to ordinary rela-
tional composition.
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to a situation of reduced knowledge, and thus extended ignorance (rel(ε1) ∪
rel(ε2)).
Proposition 5 states that collective knowledge operators are not necessary
anymore.
Proposition 5 Let tr be a translation of CSLnf formulae that replaces:
• every occurrence of D{a1,...,an} withKa1 u . . . uKan ,
• every occurrence of E{a1,...,an} withKa1 unionsq . . . unionsqKan , and
• every occurrence of C{a1,...,an} with (Ka1 unionsq . . . unionsqKan)∗.
Then,M, q |= ϕ iffM, q |= tr(ϕ).
Proof. Straightforward. 
Example 3 Consider Attacknk again. We can rewrite the properties from Sec-
tion 3 so that only individual knowledge operators are included: ¬(K1 unionsq . . . unionsq
Kk)〈〈Agt〉〉3open, (K1 u . . . u Kk)〈〈Agt〉〉3open etc. Naturally, all these proper-
ties hold in every state q ∈ Q.
Another property that can be expressed with extended epistemic expressions is:
¬(D{1,...,n−1}unionsqD{k−n+2,...,k})〈〈Agt〉〉3open ≡ ¬((K1u. . .uKn−1)unionsq(Kk−n+2u. . .u
Kk))〈〈Agt〉〉3open, which says that the subteams {1, . . . , n− 1}, {k − n+ 2, . . . , k}
do not have the ability to independently share knowledge and identify the same
winning strategy (despite the fact that each subteam can identify a successful strat-
egy on its own, cf. Section 3). However, if the subteams overlap in at least n − 2
agents then they are able to do so; the common strategy prescribes sending the
right bits by the overlapping agents and their immediate neighbors, and refrain-
ing from action by the rest. Thus, for x − y ≥ n − 3, we have that (D{1,...,x} unionsq
D{y,...,k})〈〈Agt〉〉3open.
5.2 Epistemic Expressions for Standard Knowledge
As standard knowledge can be seen as a special case of constructive knowl-
edge, one can think of combining standard knowledge in a similar way:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ε〈〈A〉〉 hϕ | ε〈〈A〉〉2ϕ | ε〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ | ε′ϕ,
ε′ ::= ∅ | Ka | ε′ | ε′ u ε′ | ε′ε′ | (ε′)∗.
Definition 6 Let constr(ε′) be the “constructive” epistemic expression ε obtained
by replacing everyKi in ε′ byKi. The semantics of ε′ϕ can be given as follows:
M, q |= ε′ϕ iffM, q |= ϕ for every q′ ∈ img(q, rel(constr(ε′))).
Alteratively, we can define a separate denotation rel′ of expressions ε′ to the same
effect.
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Again, it turns out that standard knowledge is a special case of constructive
knowledge:
Proposition 6 M, q |= ε′ϕ iff M, q |= constr(ε′)Now(ϕ).
An example non-trivial epistemic property that can be expressed in such
language is “only knowing”/“all I know” from [16]. To recall, agent i “only
knows” ϕ inM, q iff q ∼i q′ for all states q′ satisfying ϕ.
Proposition 7 Agent i “only knows” ϕ inM, q iffM, q |= Ki¬ϕ.
By this, and the fact that every formula of CSL can be equivalently rewrit-
ten to CSL with extended epistemic expressions, we get the following.
Corollary 8 CSLwith extended epistemic terms has strictlymore expressive power
than “pure” CSL.
5.3 Model Checking
Themodel checking problem asks whether a given formula ϕ holds in a given
modelM and state q. Below, we present a straightforward adaptation of the
ATLir model checking from [23] that allows tomodel-check formulae of CSLnf
with extended epistemic expressions. The algorithm invokes a general CTL
model checkermctl(ϕ,M) that returns the set of states inM which satisfy ϕ.
Functionmcheck(ϕ,M, q).
Case ϕ ≡ p: return(true) if p ∈ pi(q), else return(false);
Case ϕ ≡ ¬ψ: return(true) ifmcheck(ψ,M, q) = false, else return(false);
Case ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2: return(true) ifmcheck(ψ1,M, q) = true andmcheck(ψ2,M, q) =
true, else return(false);
Case ϕ ≡ ε〈〈A〉〉 hψ: Runmcheck(ψ,M, q) for every q ∈ St, and label the states
in which the answer was true with an additional proposition yes (not
used elsewhere). Then, guess the strategy of A, and “trim” model M
by removing all the transitions inconsistent with the strategy (yielding
a sparser modelM ′). Finally, return(true) if rel(ε) ⊆ mctl(A hyes,M ′),
else return(false).
Note: subformula ψ is checked in the original modelM , and not inM ′!
Cases ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉2ψ and ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2: analogous.
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We note that: (1) general model checking of CTL is linear with respect to
the number of transitions in the model and the length of the formula; (2)
complement, union, composition, and transitive closure of binary relations
can be computed in time linear with respect to the number of the relations
and the maximal number of tuples per relation. Thus, the above algorithm
runs in deterministic polynomial time, with calls to an oracle of anNPprob-
lem.
Proposition 9 The model checking problem for CSLnf (with extended epistemic
expressions) is in∆P2 , i.e., in the class of problems solvable in deterministic poly-
nomial time with calls to anNP oracle.
For the lower bound, we note that CSLnf subsumes ATLir, since ATLir’s cen-
tral operator 〈〈a1, . . . an〉〉ir canbe translated into CSLnf as (Ka1unionsq. . .unionsqKan)〈〈a1, . . . an〉〉 .
Moreover, model checking ATLir is∆P2 -complete [23, 12]. Thus, we get the
following.
Proposition 10 The model checking problem for CSLnf (with extended epistemic
expressions) is∆P2 -complete in the number of transitions and epistemic links in the
model, and the length of the formula.
6 Final Remarks
We have shown how the syntax and the semantics of Constructive Strate-
gic Logic can be redefined so that we obtain a more standard modal logic
without compromising expressivity or computational complexity. It does
not mean, however, that the original CSL is now obsolete. On the contrary,
we believe that only the richer semantics of full CSL provides the appropriate
conceptual framework for studying knowledge and ability under imperfect
information. “Normal form CSL” may be technically simpler, and easier to
use in theoretical analysis, but only by showing its relationship to full CSL do
we validate its conceptual merits.
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